Space, power margins as a ‘warfighting capability’ worth paying for
The basic plan for future naval vessels will be to determine how much room for future hull and power can be secured.
It has been pointed out by many that the key to the future of naval vessels will be the ability to incorporate day-to-day performance improvements in the near future, not in the distant future.
It has been pointed out by many that the key is to be able to include performance improvements in the near future, not in the distant future, but in the near future, without physical time limitations.
On the other hand, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has understood the concept of the Spurance class since it was launched.
Although efforts are being made (as is the habit of the military) to incorporate margins when the opportunity arises, such as size, drainage volume, all-through decks, and aircraft carrier-like features, there is still a lot of work to be done.
However, from a financial and accounting point of view, it is evil to allow a margin for the future that has no basis or promise, and which is not necessary now.
However, from a financial and accounting point of view, it is bad to allow room for the future without a rationale or promise, which is not inevitable now, and since we do not want to guarantee future budgets, we try to keep the amount of money we have to a minimum.
(The difference between these positions extends to everything from facilities and equipment to bases.)
What fills in this basic idea is that convoys should be continuously improved in the future to
It is more efficient and economical than building new vessels, and it is also more efficient and economical to maintain performance and prevent obsolescence.
It is also more efficient and economical than building new naval vessels, and it is necessary to reach a consensus that costs will be incurred on an ongoing basis rather than just building them.
It is necessary for the government to make up its mind, and it is expected that the plans will be reviewed this year.
Now, the SPY-7/BL-9 is a bit of an eyesore.
In recent articles and SNA presentations, there has been a reluctance to adopt a Lockheed vs. Raytheon tone, perhaps due to political considerations.
The recent articles and presentations by SNA seem to indicate that they are refraining from the Lockheed vs. Raytheon tone, perhaps for political reasons, and that they are trying to share the Aegis assets widely in the cross-domain and find a place for the SPY-6 assets in the CSL.
It seems to me that it will not be a case of SPY-6/BL10 vs. SPY-7/BL9, but rather a case of where the best will be in charge of the best.
US Navy should view space, power margins as a ‘warfighting capability’ worth paying for
